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Note
Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees
It was a cardinal rule of old equity jurisprudence that
an injunction bound only parties to the suit from which
it originated. Subsequently the rule has been liberalized
with respect to six categories of nonparties. This Note
traces and evaluates this development and concludes that
it is commendable to the extent that parties have thereby
been prevented from evading their obligations, but that
the courts have exceeded their jurisdiction insofar as
they have sought to bind nonparties pursuing their own
interests independently of the parties.
INTRODUCTION
Eighteenth and nineteenth century courts declared repeatedly
that an injunction bound only parties to the suit. This rule was
a corollary to a basic precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence -
that while the act of a legislature affects all persons within its
jurisdiction, only those who have had an opportunity to be heard
either directly or by representation may be subjected to orders
of the courts 2 By the end of the nineteenth century, however,
the courts had recognized that a decree binding no more than
those present in court did not adequately protect the interests
of the person who had secured the injunction? If all nonparties
were allowed to violate the decree with impunity, the party-
defendant could avoid the court's mandate simply by procuring
others to do the forbidden act.' As a result the courts have pur-
ported to extend the scope of persons bound by an injunction
beyond the party-defendants to six additional categories of per-
1. See, e.g., Iveson v. Harris, 7 Yes. 251, 82 Eng. Rep. 102 (Ch. 1802);
Gadd v. Worral, 2 Anstr. 555, 145 Eng. Rep. 965 (Ex. 1795); Dawson v.
Princeps, 2 Anstr. 521, 145 Eng. Rep. 954 (Ex. 1795).
2. See Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 HARv. L. REV. 487, 502
(1898); Note, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1311, 1314 (1933). As stated in Baltz v. The
Fair, 178 F. Supp. 691, 694 (N.D. Il. 1959): "It is a fundamental doctrine of
the law that a party to be affected by a personal judgment must have his
day in court and an opportunity to be heard. . . ."
3. See, e.g., Silvers v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891); Seaward
v. Paterson, [1897] 1 Ch. 545 (CA.).
4. See Silvers v. Traverse, supra note 8.
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sons: (1) agents of the enjoined party; (2) aiders and abettors of
the enjoined party; (3) successors in interest to the enjoined party;
(4) those coming into contact with a particular res (in rem in-
junctions); (5) members of the same "class" as the enjoined party
(class suits); and (6) persons cognizant of the injunction.
The purpose of this Note is to examine this six-fold extension
of the original equity rule and to determine the extent to which
it may have exceeded the bounds of traditional equity power and
become an instrument for punishing persons who have had no
opportunity to be heard either directly or by representation.
Brief consideration will also be given to the scope of the injunc-
tive power under Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.
Throughout the discussion that follows the reader should bear
in mind the fairly well-established rule that actual as opposed
to constructive knowledge is a prerequisite to binding all persons
- parties and nonparties alike.5 However, the alleged contemnor
need not have been served if he has in fact obtained the knowledge
from some other source.' As stated in Cape May & Schellenger's
Landing R.R. v. Johnson:' "Notice, to be sufficient, need possess
but two requisites - first, it must proceed from a source entitled
to credit, and second, it must inform the defendant clearly and
plainly from what act he must abstain." Notice has been deemed
sufficient when received by telegraph,' newspaper, bulletin
board,o or even word of mouth."
5. See Garrigan v. United States, 163 Fed. 16, 21 (7th Cir. 1908), cert.
denied, 214 U.S. 514 (1909); Note, Contempt Proceedings Against Persons
Not Named in an Injunction, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1311, 1312-13 (1933); Note,
Criminal Contempt: Violations of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 32 IND.
L.J. 514, 524 (1957); Note, 5 U. NEWARK L. REv. 41, 43 (1939). Courts may,
however, differ as to the degree of proof required to show actual knowledge
or a probability thereof. Compare Garrigan v. United States, 163 Fed. 16, 21
(7th Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 514 (1909), and United Packing House
Workers v. Boynton, 240 Iowa 212, 222-23, 35 N.W.2d 881, 888 (1949), with
Hill v. United States, 33 F.2d 489, 490-91 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S.
592 (1929). In rem injunctions, with respect to which actual knowledge has
not been required to bind one who comes into contact with the res, are dis-
cussed in the paragraph accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
6. See People v. Saffell, 74 Cal. App. 2d 967, 168 P.2d 497 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1946).
7. 35 N.J. Eq. 422, 425 (Ch. 1882).
8. Cape May & Schellenger's Landing R.R. v. Johnson, 35 N.J. Eq. 422
(Ch. 1882); In re Bryant, L.R. 4 Ch. Div. 98 (1876).
9. United Packing House Workers v. Boynton, 240 Iowa 212, 35 N.W.ed
881 (1949).
10. In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897).
11. Crucia v. Behrman, 147 La. 144, 84 So. 525 (1920). See generally Note,
32. IND. L.J. 514, 524 (1957).
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I. AGENTS OF THE ENJOINED PARTY
In the landmark case of Wellesley v. Mornington,' Lord Wel-
lesley obtained an injunction restraining the Earl of Mornington
from cutting timber on the former's land. Batley, the Earl's man-
ager, was served with notice of the terms of the injunction; never-
theless, he did the forbidden acts and appropriated the benefits
for the Earl. Lord Wellesley commenced proceedings against
Batley, then decided not to press for his imprisonment for con-
tempt. The court noted in dictum that had plaintiff persisted,
Batley would have been committed, for "Batley, in the position
in which he was, and knowing the duty of the Earl ... ought to
have taken care not to do any acts, in violation of the order of
the Court."'s
Today it is clearly established that the agents of a person
bound by an injunction, whether or not they are parties to the
original injunction proceeding, may be punished for contempt
for doing the things prohibited by the decree. Moreover, it ap-
pears that the courts rely on traditional agency principles to
determine whether a person is an "agent" of the person bound. For
example, an injunction which is directed at a corporation also
runs against the corporation's officers" and employees.'5 Similar-
ly, an injunction restraining a party from operating a particular
business is binding upon his partner,"' co-owner,'7 and attorney at
law or in fact.'
The inclusion of agents within the scope of persons bound by
an injunction seems to be a legitimate extension of the old equity
practice. It is not unfair to deny the agent the right to relitigate
the issues underlying issuance of the injunction. On these issues,
he has already been granted a hearing - not directly, but by
representation. Since by definition an agent acts at the behest
and for the benefit of his principal, his interest in the merits of
the injunction is a function of the interests of his principal, and
the principal has already had his day in court. Of course, the
12. 11 Beavan 181, 50 Eng. Rep. 786 (Ch. 1848).
13. Id. at 183, 50 Eng. Rep. at 787.
14. Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 870, 374 (Ist Cir. 1942); Fiedler v.
Bambrick, 135 Mo. App. 301, 115 S.W. 1033 (1909); City of Scranton v.
People's Coal Co., 274 Pa. 63, 117 Ati. 678 (1922).
15. See Diamond Drill & Mach. Co. v. Kelly Bros. & Spielman, 132 Fed. 978
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1904) (the employee need not be compensated); Toledo, A.A. &
No. Mich. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 746, 750 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893).
16. State ex rel. Kruckman v. Rogers, 124 Ore. 656, 265 Pac. 784 (1928).
17. Hickinbotham v. Williams, 228 Ark. 46, 305 S.W.2d 841 (1957).
18. In re Rice, 181 Fed. 217, 220-21 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1910); Court Rose
No. 12, Foresters of America v. Coma, 279 I. 605, 117 N.E. 144 (1917); Root
v. Conkling, 108 Misc. 234, 177 N.Y. Supp. 610 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
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agent ought to and will be given a hearing on the one issue as
to which he does have an interest distinguishable from that of
his master, i.e., whether his acts constituted a violation of the
decree.
Consistent with this analysis, an agent who severs his legal
identity with his principal and acts instead for his own benefit,
or otherwise acts outside the scope of his agency, is no longer
bound by the decree. Since he may now have an interest in the
merits of the injunction distinct from that of the party-principal,
he ought not to be condemned without a hearing. This was the
rationale of Judge Learned Hand in his frequently cited opinion
in Alemite Mfg. Corp. p. Staff.19 In that case, the plaintiff had
secured an injunction against B, "his agents, employees, associ-
ates and conferates," enjoining them from infringing a patent. At
the time the decree was entered, A was an employee of B. Subse-
quently he left B's employ, began his own business, and infringed
the patent. The plaintiff instituted contempt proceedings. The
court held that since A was no longer legally identified with B,
he was not punishable for contempt. In the course of his opinion
Judge Hand stated that "the only occasion when a person not a
party may be punished, is when he has helped to bring about, not
merely what the decree has forbidden, because it may have gone
too far, but what it has the power to forbid, an act of a party."20
II. AIDERS AND ABETTORS OF THE ENJOINED PARTY
The notion that a person not a party to the original injunction
proceeding will nonetheless be bound if he aids or abets the
party-defendant in a violation was first advanced in 1897 in
Seaward v. Paterson,2' where a lessor obtained an injunction re-
straining his lessee from violating a covenant requiring quiet and
orderly occupancy. In disregard to this decree, the lessee, assisted
19. 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930).
20. Id. at 833; see Harvey v. Bettis, 35 F.2d 349, (9th Cir. 1929); Dadirrian
v. Gullian, 79 Fed. 784 (C.C.D.NJ. 1897); Toledo, A.A. &. No. Mich. Ry. v.
Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 746, 756 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893). But 8ee Campbell
v. Magnet Light Co., 175 Fed. 117 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909).
The rule applies equally to directors or officers of a corporation who sever
their legal identity with the corporation and then commit the prohibited acts
on their own behalf. See Mexican Ore Co. v. Mexican Guadalupe Mining Co.,
47 Fed. 851 (C.C.D.N.J. 1891); Hoover Co. v. Exchange Vacuum Cleaner
Co., 1 F. Supp. 997 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); of. Nickerson v. Dowd, 174 N.E.2d 346
(Mass. 1961). In Nickeron the court said a temporary restraining order
against D and her agents and attorneys was not to be construed as imposing
a restraint upon D's attorney while acting as counsel for others.
21. [1897] 1 Ch. 545 (CA.).
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by M, held boxing matches on the premises aild caused a serious
disturbance. In a contempt proceeding brought against him, M
contended that since he was neither a party to the injunction
proceeding nor a servant or agent of a party, the court lacked
power to punish him." This argument was rejected and M was
held guilty of contempt - not for breach of the injunction, since
he was not a party to the suit, but for obstructing the course of
justice. The court noted:
A motion to commit a man for breach of an injunction, which is tech-
nically wrong unless he is bound by the injunction is one thing; and a
motion to commit a man for contempt of Court, not because he is
bound by the injunction by being a party to the cause, but because
he is conducting himself so as to obstruct the course of justice, is
another and a totally different thing.. .. In the one case the party
who is bound by the injunction is proceeded against for the purpose
of enforcing the order of the Court for the benefit of the person who
got it. In the other case the Court will not allow its process to be set
at naught and treated with contempt2 3
It is clearly established today that persons who aid or abet
the party-defendant in violating the injunction are subject to
contempt proceedings. But in dealing with aiders and abettors
the courts have not preserved the distinction expounded in Sea-
ward v. Paterson between breach of an injunction and obstruction
of the course of justice. The consequence of the distinction was to
make the aider or abettor liable for criminal contempt for flouting
the authority of the court, but not for civil contempt for breach
of the injunction. 4 In 1930, Judge Learned Hand said in the
Alemite decision: "We agree that a person who knowingly assists
a defendant in violating an injunction subjects himself to civil
as well as criminal proceedings for contempt. This is well settled
law."a It appears that there was no precedent for that state-
ment," and that the "well settled law" was in fact to the con-
22. Counsel for M cited both Iveson v. Harris, 7 Ves. 251, 32 Eng. Rep.
102 (Ch. 1802), and Wellesley v. Mornington, 11 Beavan 181, 50 Eng. Rep.
786 (Ch. 1848), in support of his contention.
28. [1897] 1 Ch. at 555-56.
24. As to the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, see Mosko-
vitz, Contempt of Injunctions, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 780 (1943).
25. 42 F.2d at 882.
26. The court cited four cases in support of the proposition. Two, In re
Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897), and Wellesley v. Mornington, 11 Beavan 181,
50 Eng. Rep. 786 (Ch. 1848), involved agents, rather than abettors, and hence
are inapplicable. The other two, W. B. Conkey Co. v. Russell, 111 Fed. 417
(C.C.D. Ind. 1901), and Seaward v. Paterson, [1897] 1 Ch. 545 (C.A.), are
also inapplicable, since they involved proceedings for criminal, rather than
civil, contempt.
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trary.27 Since Alemite, however, courts have held aiders and
abettors subject to civil as well as criminal contempt proceed-
ings.28 Such a procedure, although not well founded in precedent,
seems sound both analytically and for reasons of policy. Although
the aider or abettor may not act on the order of the party-
defendant, he resembles an agent to the extent that he acts for
the benefit of the party-defendant and therefore lacks an inde-
pendent interest in the merits of the injunction. Given this legal
identity of interests, there is no reason to deny the plaintiff a
civil remedy against the aider -or abettor as well as the party-
defendant.
The significant inquiry in this area involves determining the
acts which constitute aiding or abetting. Since the purpose of the
aider and abettor extension is to make the injunction effectual
against all persons acting in conjunction with the enjoined party,29
the crucial element is the existence of collusion between the
abettor and the party-defendant.0 o Further, the alleged aider or
abettor must have participated in the violation; his mere approval
of the defendant's conduct is insufficient to render him liable for
contempt. 1
Where a person other than the party-defiendant violates an
injunction, but does so wholly independently of the party-
defendant and for his own benefit, it seems clear that he is not
an aider or abettor and is not subject to the injunction even
though the plaintiff is injured in the same manner and to the
same extent as he would have been had the act been perpetrated
27. See, e.g., Garrigan v. United States, 163 Fed. 16 (7th Cir. 1908), cert.
denied, 214 U.S. 514 (1909); Huttig Sash & Door v. Fuelle, 143 Fed. 863
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1906); In re Reese, 107 Fed. 942 (8th Cir. 1901); McCnemrocK,
EQuITY § 17, at 37 (2d ed. 1948); Note, 5 U. NEwARKL . REV. 41 (1939); 17
MNx. L. REV. 447 (1933).
28. See Chanel Indus., Inc. v. Pierre Marche, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 748 (E.D.
Mo. 1961); Baltimore Transit Co. v. Flynn, 50 F. Supp. 382 (D. Md. 1943).
But see In re Wholesale Licensed Alcoholic Beverage Salesmen's Union, 125
N.J. Eq. 539, 6 A.2d 660 (Ch. 1939); In re Staire, Ill NJ. Eq. 985, 162 Atl.
195 (Ch. 1932). See also Reich v. United States, 239 F.2d 134, 137 (1st Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957).
29. See Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 167 Pac. 143 (1917); People
v. Saffell, 74 Cal. App. ed 967, 168 P.2d 497 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1946).
30. See In the Matter of Morford, 137 Cal. App. 662, 31 P.2d 406 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1934).
31. In State v. Nouris, 15 Del. Ch. 282, 285, 136 Atl. 887, 888 (Ch. 1927),
the court said that "merely being in company with a man will not, in the
absence of something indicating a participating purpose, make one guilty as an
aider and abetter of all that his companion does or says." But see Roesch
Enamel Range Co. v. Carbine, 247 Ill. App. 248 (1928).
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by the defendant.32 Such a person must be afforded an oppor-
tunity to protect his interest in the merits of the injunction.
The difficult case for determination lies between the polar
situations represented by the person who acts solely to aid or
benefit the defendant, and by the person who acts wholly inde-
pendently of the defendant. Such a case is posed where a person,
knowing of the injunction, incidentally "aids" the defendant in
accomplishing the proscribed act because of his own independent
interest in having it done. For example, in one recent case the
United States obtained by default judgment an injunction
against the Wilhelm Reich Foundation, Dr. Reich, and another
individual, restraining them from manufacturing and distributing
"orgone energy accumulators," which allegedly were misbranded
and adulterated in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act. 3 Copies of the decree were mailed to Dr. Michael
Silvert and several other licensed psychiatrists active in the field
of orgonomy, who proceeded to apply to the court for leave to
intervene in the injunction suit. Their application was denied on
the ground that the decree resulting from the suit would not be
binding on them so long as they acted independently of the de-
fendants." Apparently Dr. Silvert later aided one of the named
defendants in shipping an accumulator to Silvert in the course
of pursuing his own interests. 5 The court held him in contempt
for having aided and abetted a violation. 6
The interest of the United States in preventing shipment by
the defendants and that of Silvert in being heard on the merits
in order to protect his independent interests in the field of orgon-
omy seem equally balanced. Given this rough equality of inter-
ests, the court which issued the injunction ought to have per-
32. See United Pharmacal Corp. v. United States, 306 F.2d 515 (1st Cir.
1962); Garrigan v. United States, 163 Fed. 16 (7th Cir. 1908), cert. denied,
214 U.S. 514 (1909); United States Playing Card Co. v. Spalding, 92 Fed. 368
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899); Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 167 Pac. 143
(1917); People v. Saffell, 74 Cal. App. 2d 967, 168 P.2d 497 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1946); In re Wholesale Licensed Alcoholic Beverage Salesmen's Union,
125 N.J. Eq. 539, 6 A.2d 660 (Ch. 1939).
33. Section 301(a), (k), 52 Stat. 1049 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §
331(a), (k) (1958).
34. United States v. Wilhelm Reich Foundation, 17 F.R.D. 96, 102 (D.
Me. 1954), aff'd men. sub non. Baker v. United States, 221 F.d 957 (1st
Cir. 1955).
35. See Petitioner's Reply Brief on Petition for Certiorari, p. 5, Reich v.
United States, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957).
36. Reich v. United States, 239 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 1004 (1957).
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mitted Dr. Silvert and his colleagues to intervene pursuant to
Rule 24(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for intervention of right "when the representation of the
applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate
and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the ac-
tion."3 7 Had he been permitted to intervene, Dr. Silvert could
have interposed all available defenses such as the obvious one that
the manufacture and distribution of the orgone energy accumu-
lators did not constitute a violation of the Food and Drug Act.
Had he intervened and lost, and subsequently violated the injunc-
tion, the court would have been justified in holding him bound
by the decree. Intervention would have been especially appropri-
ate in this particular case, since it appears that Reich was ap-
parently the only manufacturer of accumulators, and consequent-
ly was heavily relied upon by Silvert as a continuing source of
supply." Having been denied intervention of right because of a
relatively narrow construction of the language "bound by a judg-
ment," it would seem that Dr. Silvert should not have been sub-
sequently bound.
Analogous cases are not hard to imagine. Whenever an injunc-
tion prohibiting production is sought against a manufacturer
under contract with wholesalers, the latter have an independent
interest in defending the suit. In such a case, as in Reich, a whole-
saler who attempted to induce the manufacturer to make and
ship its products would clearly be aiding and abetting a violation
of the injunction and consequently would, as a practical matter,
be "bound by a judgment in the action." If permitted to inter-
vene, he would be subject directly to the prohibitions of any
injunction issued. Moreover, he also could reasonably be held to
be bound if he were aware of a right to intervene and failed to
exercise it.
87. Intervention as of right has been construed to be available under rule
24(a)(2) only if the judgment in the action may be res judicata as to the per-
son seeking intervention. See United States v. Wilhelm Reich Foundation, 17
F.R.D. 96, 100 (D. Me. 1954), and cases cited therein. This construction seems
unnecessarily restrictive where, as in Reich, the judgment, although not con-
clusive of the applicant's legal status, could leave him at a practical disad-
vantage. See Note, 63 YALE LJ. 408, 415 (1954).
38. One who obtains from a third party a product in which the defendant
is enjoined from dealing is not aiding or abetting a violation by the defendant
and consequently is not bound by the injunction. United Pharmacal Corp. v.
United States, 306 F.2d 515 (Ist Cir. 1962); Baltz v. The Fair, 178 F. Supp.
691 (N.D. Ill. 1959). See also United States Playing Card Co. v. Spalding, 92
Fed. 368 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899) (dealer enjoined; manufacturer is free to sell to
other dealers).
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It is not altogether clear how broadly the courts will construe
rule 24(a) (2). However, it is submitted that a person with an
independent interest ought not to be regarded as within the scope
of an injunction if he has been denied an opportunity to protect
that interest through intervention in the original injunction
proceedings on the ground that he would not be "bound by the
judgment." Thus the phrases "bound by a judgment" and "bound
by the injunction" ought to be construed interdependently.
III. SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST TO THE ENJOINED
PARTY
Injunction decrees commonly purport to bind the defendant
and his "successors and assigns." However, it is well-established
that the mere inclusion of this language does not broaden the
obligation which would exist in its absence. 9 Whether a person is
subject to an injunction as a "successor or assign" of the defend-
ant will depend on an appraisal of their relationship and not
simply upon a construction of the terms of the decree.
Courts often state that those successors in privity with the
defendant will be bound by an injunction decree.40 However, they
do not agree on what constitutes privity. The relationship which
exists between grantor and grantee in a conveyance, or vendor and
vendee in a sale, is apparently insufficient to establish "privity"
in Arkansas,41 Iowa,42 Montana,43 and the Seventh Circuit.44 On
39. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 824 U.S. 9 (1945); Le Tourneau Co. v.
NLRB, 150 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1945); NLRB v. Blackstone Mfg. Co., 123
F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1941); see Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S.
431 (1934); Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1950); Alemite Mfg. Corp.
v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930); In re Wholesale Licensed Alcoholic Bev-
erage Salesmen's Union, 125 NJ. Eq. 539, 6 A.2d 660 (Ch. 1939).
If the insertion of the words "successors and assigns" has no legal effect,
it would seem that Mr. Chief Justice Stone's dissent in Regal Knitwear v.
NLRB, supra at 16-17, is correct. He argued that the words "successors and
assigns" should have been deleted from an NLRB cease and desist order since
they did not increase the scope of the order, but might well have had an
adverse effect on the salability of the employer's business to purchasers who
would not in fact be bound by the decree.
40. E.g., Baltz v. The Fair, 178 F. Supp. 691, 698 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Ahlers
v. Thomas, 24 Nev. 407, 408, 56 Fac. 93, 94 (1899); see Swetland v. Curry,
188 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1951).
41. Rogers v. State ex rel. Robinson, 194 Ark. 633, 109 S.W.2d 120 (1937).
42. Pearson v. District Court, 90 Iowa 756, 57 N.W. 871 (1894); Bu1man
v. Humphrey, 86 Iowa 597, 53 N.W. 318 (1892).
43. State ex. rel. Pool v. District Court, 34 Mont. 258, 266, 86 Pac. 798,
801 (1906) (dictum).
44. Gallagin v. United States, 282 Fed. 606 (7th Cir. 1922).
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the other hand, such a tie has been held to be adequate in Ne-
braska," Nevada," and the First Circuit,47 and probably would
be so held in Illinois." Since the case law contains little or no
analysis of the scope of privity in this context, it is a conclusory
term at best. It would seem that it ought to be defined to include
only relationships arising from transfers that are designed to
evade the decree."9 In effect this would mean that a successor or
assign is bound only if he is an agent or aider or abettor of the
defendant. Where the successor acts in collusion with the defend-
ant he will be bound, but where the transfer transaction is bona
fide, the successor will possess an independent interest in the
merits of the injunction and is entitled to have his day in court.o
The rule binding successors has led in recent years to injunc-
tions against a particular office and its present and future occu-
pants." The foregoing analysis seems to require that only the
incumbent at the time of suit and those successors acting in con-
cert with him be bound, e.g., situations where a public official
is replaced wholly to avoid the impact of an injunction directed
against his office.52 However, the individual interests of successive
officeholders, qua officeholders, in the issues underlying an injunc-
tion against their office probably would be negligible. Conse-
quently there should be no concern in treating them essentially
as a single party.
45. Wilcox v. Ashford, 131 Neb. 338, 268 N.W. 81 (1936).
46. Ahlers v. Thomas, 24 Nev. 407, 56 Pac. 93 (1899).
47. Rivera v. Lawton, 35 F.2d 823 (1st Cir. 1929).
48. See Safford v. People, 85 Ill. 558 (1877) (injunction against railway
company binds its receiver).
49. The most obvious cases of evasion are those in which the original
party-defendant continues to operate as before, following a mere change in
form. See United States v. Schine, 260 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 934 (1959); Chanel Indus., Inc. v. Pierre Marche, Inc., 199 F. Supp.
748 (E.D. Mo. 1961); State Bd. of Funeral Directors v. Cooksey, 155 Fla.
761, 21 So. 2d 542 (1945); Clark v. Most Worshipful St. John's Grand Lodge,
198 Okla. 621, 181 P.2d 229 (1947); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McKelvey
Hughes Co., 64 Pa. Super. 57 (1916).
50. See Note, 46 HARv. L. REV. 1311, 1314 (1933); note 32 supra and ac-
companying text.
51. E.g., Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ala. 1963); Crucia v.
Behrman, 147 La. 144, 84 So. 525 (1920); see United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d
733 (5th Cir. 1963). See also Acheson v. Albert, 195 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
52. See Crucia v. Behrman, supra note 51, where an injunction against an
inspector of police was held to run against the office and embrace all charged
with the execution of its functions; for, "otherwise, by the mere changing or
shifting of individuals, such writs could be violated with impunity and the
court's orders rendered nugatory." Cf. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,
245 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1917).
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IV. THOSE COMNG INTO CONTACT WITH A
PARTICULAR RES (IN REM INJUNCTIONS)
It is an ancient maxim that equity acts in personam and not
in rem.53 However, in response to the difficulties posed by rigid
adherence to this rule, statutes have been enacted permitting
courts of equity to convey title to property." These statutes have
been construed to permit equity to act in rem upon the property
itself notwithstanding the owner's refusal to obey a judicial
decree that title be transferred. 5 Some courts have found an
inherent power to act in rem to transfer title even in the absence
of statute.ne
By the late nineteenth century the courts began to apply their
in rem power not only to effectuate transfers of property, but
also to restrict the use of property. Thus, injunctions were issued
purporting to bind all successive possessors of the res. The leading
American case is Silvers v. Traverse,"7 which arose out of a
decree for the abatement of a liquor nuisance on premises owned
by the defendant. Silvers, a lessee of the defendant, sold liquor
on the premises and was held in contempt.
The decree was a restriction upon the use of the property which fol-
lowed it as a burden, and, as it were, an incumbrance... . If the rule
we announce be not recognized, the attempt to enforce injunctions to
abate nuisances of all kinds would be vain. The defendant perpetrat-
ing the nuisance could wholly defeat the law by leasing or transferring
the property to one who had no notice thereof. He could begin anew
the perpetration, and could only be enjoined by a new action, and when
so enjoined he could in a like manner transfer the property and so on
indefinitely, defeating the law, to the scandal of public justice, and the
oppression of the people.58
A sizeable body of case law in accord with Silvers v. Traverse has
developed since the turn of the century."
53. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 21 (2d ed. 1948); PoMRoy, EQUITY Jumis-
PRUDENCE § 170 (5th ed. 1941).
54. Leighton, Development of In Rem Powers of Courts of Equity, 5
NAT'L B.J. 1 (1947); Walsh, Development in Equity of the Power To Act In
Rem, 6 N.Y.U.TJL. REv. 1 (1928).
55. See, e.g., Garfein v. McInnis, 248 N.Y. 261, 162 N.E. 78 (1928).
56. See, e.g., Union Sulphur Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 32 F.2d 517
(S.D. Tex. 1929) Bush v. Aldrich, 110 S.C. 491, 96 S.E. 922 (1918); Tennant's
Heirs v. Fretts, 67 W. Va. 569, 68 S.E. 387 (1910).
57. 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891).
58. Id. at 56, 47 N.W. at 889.
59. Converse v. Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1939); United
States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Mo. 1946); Cherry
v. Insull Util. Invs., Inc., 58 F.2d 1022 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, 61 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1932); Dermedy
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This expansion of the equitable power to act in rem seems
undesirable. Doubtless an in rem decree is a useful and unobjec-
tionable device for transferring title to real property. However,
to the extent that a decree purports to restrict the otherwise
permissible use of property by all who come into contact with it,
including those who have no connection whatever with the de-
fendant in the original injunction proceeding, persons with inde-
pendent interests in the property are deprived of an opportunity
to litigate the merits of the injunction. Such a decree, if given
effect, would bind persons who clearly could not be bound by
an injunction in personam on any of the grounds discussed in
earlier sections of this Note.
The significant difference in scope between an in rem injunc-
tion and others is best illustrated by contrasting the in rem decree
with a decree purporting to bind all successors in interest. When
an injunction issues against a property owner and "his successors
and assigns," it is clear that a purchaser of the property cannot be
bound solely by virtue of having succeeded to the defendant's
property interest.0 o But if the injunction issues in rem against the
property itself, all subsequent purchasers are automatically bound.
These two lines of legal authority converged in United States v.
Dean Rubber Mfg. Co.1 The court there held that a decree acted
in rem as to a corporation's stock of defective rubber prophylactics
on hand at the time of suit and consequently bound all successive
owners "of the rem." But as to any defective prophylactics ac-
quired by the corporation subsequent to the litigation, the decree
acted in personam, binding only parties or those in "privity" with
them.62 This distinction dramatically illustrates the absurdity of
permitting two conflicting lines of legal analysis - one binding
"successors" and the other binding property "in rem" - to co-
exist. There is no conceivable policy reason for having bound one
group of persons to that part of the decree which dealt with stock
to be acquired, and a much broader group to that part concerning
stock on hand.
Another disturbing outgrowth of the use of in rem injunctions
v. Jackson, 147 Iowa 620, 125 N.W. 228 (1910); Frey v. Willey, 161 Kan.
196, 166 P.2d 659 (1946); State v. Porter, 76 Kan. 411, 91 Pac. 1073 (1907);
Chaffin v. Robinson, 187 Tenn. 125, 213 S.W.2d s2 (1948); State v. Terry,
99 Wash. 1, 168 Pac. 513 (1917); see Eldred, The Use of the Injunction To
Abate Saloons, 26 Ky. L.J. 235 (1938); Note, 46 HAav. L. REv. 1311, 1314
(1933); Note, The Inefficiency of Injunctions To Bind the Land, 72 L.T. 22
(1881).
60. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
61. 71 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Mo. 1946).
62. Id. at 98.
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is their seeming inconsistency with the long line of cases requiring
that a person must have actual knowledge of an injunction to be
held in contempt for violation of its provisions. 3 Courts issuing
in rem injunctions have reasoned from property law analogies
that the mere issuance of the decree gives constructive notice of
its terms to all who come in contact with the property. This
seems to be an, improper extension of the courts' equity power.
While constructive notice through a recording system may be an
adequate and necessary basis for holding subsequent purchasers
to knowledge of the existence of liens and incumbrances which
may affect the value of their property interests, it seems clearly
insufficient to justify imposition of severe criminal penalties for
violating the terms of an injunction.
In rem injunctions are further objectionable where they enjoin
criminal conduct," thereby depriving the alleged contemnor of
many of the rights which he would have had in a criminal pro-
ceeding.""
V. MEMBERS OF THE SAME "CLASS" AS THE
ENJOINED PARTY (CLASS SUITS)
The Supreme Court first considered the extent to which a
judgment against representatives of a class binds other members
63. See note 5 supra; 21 HARV. L. REv. 220 (1908).
64. See State v. Porter, 76 Kan. 411, 91 Pac. 1073 (1907); State v. Terry,
99 Wash. 1, 3, 168 Pac. 513, 514 (1917).
65. See, e.g., Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1950) (injunction
against criminal trespass); State v. Terry, 99 Wash. 1, 168 Pac. 513 (1917)
(injunction against violation of red-light statute). In addition, see Eldred,
s-upra note 59.
66. See Kean v. Hurley, supra note 65, at 891:
[O]ne charged with violation of the criminal laws is entitled to trial
by jury and is entitled to be acquitted unless the evidence be such as
to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If an injunction against
the world at large may be sustained, then one doing an act with refer-
ence to the premises involved which under the state law might consti-
tute a criminal offense, may be punished as in contempt of court. In
such proceedings the party charged is deprived of the right to trial by
jury and his offense, if any, may be established by a preponderance of
the evidence as distinguished from evidence proving his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Such a procedure would go far toward establishing
government by injunction.
Cf. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964). The undesirability of sub-
stituting contempt proceedings for a criminal trial has been fully treated
elsewhere. See Leflar, Equitable Prevention of Public Wrongs, 14 TunAs L.
REv. 427 (1936); Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 HAnv. L. REV.
389 (1908); Maloney, Injunctive Law Enforcement: Leaven or Secret Weapon,
1 MERcER L. REv. 1 (1949); Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50
HARv. L. REv. 171, 226-28 (1936); Note, 20 Cormw. L. REv. 605 (1920).
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of the class in 1853." Persons representing 1,500 claimants filed a
bill in chancery against persons representing 3,000 defendants.
The Court recognized that to require all the members of both
classes to be brought into court would be impracticable, and
might even amount to a denial of justice, since changes in mem-
bers were "constantly occurring by death of otherwise."" There-
fore it allowed the representative plaintiffs to maintain the bill
against the representative defendants, indicating by dictum that
the result would be binding on all the members of both classes.
The significant problem in this area is to determine the char-
acteristics of a valid class. 9 The justification for binding the
members of a class by an injunction against its representatives
may lie in a conception of the privileges and obligations of mem-
bership in a group. If an individual joins an organization which
is formed for the purpose of representing its members in a par-
ticular endeavor, it seems reasonable to conclude that in return
for the advancement of the individual's interest by the organiza-
tion, the individual has relinquished his right to act independently
in that area, even in his own self-interest, to the extent that
activity by the organization to which he belongs has been
enjoined.
A minimal requirement to create a valid class is the existence
of a substantial identity of interest between the representatives
and the absent members." But this alone is not sufficient. If it
67. Smith v. Swormstedt, 54 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
68. Id. at 803.
69. In the federal courts class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Commentators on this provision have
stated that where the interest of the members is joint or common -the "true"
class action - the judgment is conclusive on the whole class; where the inter-
est is several and the object of the action involves specific property-the
"hybrid" class action-all members of the class are concluded as to their
rights in the res; where the interest is several with a common question of law
or fact affecting the several rights-the "spurious" class action-only the
representatives in court are bound. See United States v. Wilhelm Reich
Foundation, 17 F.R.D. 96, 102 (D. Me. 1954), af'd mem. sub nom. Baker v.
United States, 221 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1955); HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SysTEM 934 (1953); Note, Federal Class Actions:
A Suggested Revision of Rule 28, 46 CoLum. L. REV. 818, 824 (1946). A pre-
liminary draft of rule 23 suggested that this scheme be codified as part of the
rule. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.08 (2d ed. 1964); Moore, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft,
25 GEo. L.J. 551, 571 (1937). Other commentators have rejected this tripartite
scheme. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS 49 26, 86, 116 (1942); CHAFEE, SOME
PROBLEMS OF EQuiTY 258 (1950); Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben
Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948); Note, 46 CoLum. L. REv. 818 (1946).
70. Ayres v. Carver, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 591 (1854); Keyes v. Little York
Gold Washing & Water Co., 53 Cal. 724 (1879); Newton v. Egmont, 5 Sim.
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were, a court could extend the scope of an injunction at will to
encompass persons wholly unconnected with the party-defendants.
To be consistent with the justification of class injunctions stated
above, there must also exist a ready-made bond of association
between the representatives and the other members. 7 ' The asso-
ciation must have been formed prior to the commencemnt of the
lawsuit and must have an established structure. Thus, all persons
belonging to a specified labor union' or a local chapter of the
Committee on Racial Equality" would be members of a valid
class of defendants.
At the other extreme it seems clear that an injunction could
not bind, for example, all persons trespassing on plaintiffs prop-
erty.74 Similarly, it would seem that a class injunction could not
issue in race relations litigation against all of the white citizens
of a community or all persons owning places of public accommo-
dation in a given city.75 But where the persons involved are
organized into a "citizens' council" or a Ku Klux Klan unit, a
valid class may exist.
VI. PERSONS COGNIZANT OF THE INJUNCTION
As indicated at the outset, actual notice is generally con-
sidered necessary to bind nonparties to the provisions of an
130, 137, 58 Eng. Rep. 286, 289 (Ex. 1832); of. Chafee, Bills of Peace With
Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1308 (1932). According to Chafee
"if the unjoined persons have special claims or liabilities, their rights are
personal and can not be concluded in their absence. This cardinal principle
of class suits has frequently been expressed as requiring that the subject
matter of suit must be in the nature of a 'general right."' Ibid.
71. Letter From George Wharton Pepper to Professor Arthur John Keeffe,
March 24, 1948, appended to Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 69, at
349-50.
In the final analysis, this requirement may embody the only relevant
distinction between the joint interest found in a true class action and the
several interests involved in a spurious class action under federal rule 23.
See note 69 supra. This may explain why only those present in court are
bound in a spurious class action, so that as a practical matter such an action
is not really a class action at all when the "representatives" of the "class" are
defendants rather than plaintiffs.
72. See, e.g., United Packing House Workers v. Boynton, 240 Iowa 212,
35 N.W.2d 881 (1949); Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 56 Ohio
L. Abs. 65, 90 N.E.2d 610 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County), appeal dismissed,
153 Ohio St. 589, 92 N.E.2d 689 (1950).
73. Petition of Curtis, 227 F. Supp. 438 (E.D. Mo. 1964).
74. Cf. Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1950); Chisolm v. Caines,
147 F. Supp. 188 (E.D.S.C. 1954).
75. See Plummer v. Brock, 9 RACE REr. L. REP. 1399, 1401 (M.D. Fla.
1964).
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injunction. However, several courts, apparently believing it is
the only prerequisite, have issued decrees purporting to bind all
persons having the required notice.
This practice grew out of the Pullman strikes of 1893-1894
and the landmark case which they produced, In re Debs.7" The
United States had filed a bill alleging interference by the Pullman
strikers and by officers of the American Railway Union with
interstate commerce and the carriage of the mails pursuant to a
conspiracy in restraint of trade. An injunction issued restraining
the union officers, "all persons combining and conspiring with
them, and all other persons whomsoever,"77 and providing that
it should be in force as to all persons not named from the time
they severally obtained knowledge of it. Informations for con-
tempt were later filed in the circuit court against the party-
defendants and hundreds of other persons not named in the bill
or injunction, virtually all of whom were convicted and pun-
ished.78 The record did not show whether the nonparty contemn-
ors were agents or abettors of the party-defendant79 or mem-
bers of a valid class.
Despite a substantial volume of criticism condemning the
broad scope of the Debs injunction as producing "government by
injunction,""o similar injunctions were issued for many years by
both federal" and state82 courts. The practice was ostensibly laid
to rest in 1930 by the following statement of Judge Learned
Hand:
[Al court of equity . . . cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large, no
matter how broadly it words its decree. If it assumes to do so, the
decree is pro tanto brutum fulmen, and the persons enjoined are free to
ignore it. It is not vested with sovereign powers to declare conduct
unlawful; its jurisdiction is limited to those over whom it gets personal
service, and who therefore can have their day in court.83
76. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
77. Id. at 570.
78. United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), af'd, 158 U.S.
564 (1895).
79. See DuNBAn, GOVERNMENT BY INJUNCTION 32 (1898).
80. See, e.g., DUNBAR, GOVERNMENT BY INJUNCTION (1898); Bonney,
Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes, 7 MN. L. REV. 467 (1923); Fureseth,
Government by Injunction-The Misuse of Equity Power, 71 CENT. L.J. 5
(1910).
81. See, e.g., In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897); Chisolm v. Caines, 121
Fed. 897 (C.C.D.S.C. 1903).
82. See, e.g., American Zinc Co. v. Vecera, 388 Ill. App. 523, 88 N.E.2d
116 (1949); In re Coggshall, 100 Mo. App. 585, 75 S.W. 183 (1903). But see
Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 167 Pac. 143 (1917); Rigas v. Livings-
ton, 178 N.Y. 20, 70 N.E. 107 (1904).
83. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832-33 (2d Cir. 1930).
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However, the civil rights litigation of recent years has wit-
nessed a resurgence in the use of sweeping injunctions purporting
to bind all those having knowledge of them. The federal courts
have issued them against segregationists" and the state courts
have treated integrationists similarly.5 For example, in Plummer
v. Brock"8 a group of Negroes brought an action under Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 196487 against, inter alia, certain named
individuals and an unincorporated club for injunctive relief
against discrimination in places of public accommodation. The
petition alleged that the defendants had interfered by violence,
intimidation, and coercion with Negroes who sought service in
previously segregated places of public accommodation. The court
issued an injunction against 19 named defendants, the unincorpo-
rated club, each of its members, and "any other persons to whom
notice or knowledge of this order may come," restraining them
from violating section 203 of the act by threatening and coercing
Negroes for the purpose of interfering with any Negro's right to
seek and enjoy accommodations at any of the places identified
in the injunction.
Despite the relatively frequent incorporation of such language
in injunction decrees issued in recent years, there is a dearth of
cases actually holding a person in contempt solely on the basis
of his knowledge of such a decree.8 It seems clear that a court
would exceed its power insofar as it might attempt to hold a
person in contempt solely on the ground that he violated an in-
junction after receiving knowledge of its provisions.9 No matter
how appealing the merits of a particular case, the courts ought to
keep firmly in mind that they possess jurisdiction to act only
against persons before them in fact or by valid representation.
VII. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 65(d)
Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
in part:
84. See, e.g., Plummer v. Brock, 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 1899, 1412 (M.D.
Fla. 1964).
85. See, e.g., State ex rel. Flowers v. Robinson, 8 RACE RELs. L. REP. 848
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Etowah County 1963); Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc. v.
Opton, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 565 (N.C. Durham County Super. Ct. 1962).
86. 9 RACE REm. L. REP. 1399 (M.D. Fla. 1964).
87. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (1964).
88. Even in the Debs case it is not clear that the persons held in contempt
could not have been held as agents, aiders and abettors, or members of a
class. See notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
89. See Chase Natl Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431 (1934); Kean
v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1950); Note, 32 IND. L.J. 514, 525 (1957).
But see Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 630, 639 (1956).
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Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order . . .
is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
order by personal service or otherwise 0
Judicial fidelity to rule 65(d) and its counterparts in the states
would result in proper limitation upon the scope of persons bound
by an injunction in most cases. Agents and abettors are clearly
bound, while successors in interest, as such, are by negative impli-
cation beyond its scope. The rule does not explicitly speak to the
efficacy of class suits, but a defendant class would probably be
construed to be a "party."91 Certainly a decree purporting to bind
"all persons whomsoever" or even "all persons with knowledge"
would be a nullity under the rule."
The status of in rem injunctions under the rule is not as clear.
Rule 65(d) has been said to embody the common law.93 Since in
rem decrees, rightly or wrongly, have been enforced by some
courts under the common law," one court has granted an injunc-
tion in rem under the rule.95 Nevertheless, a rejection of the in
rem injunction is dictated both by its impropriety even at com-
mon law" and by the language of the rule, which requires "active
concert or participation" with a party to the suit and "actual no-
tice" for a person to be bound.
CONCLUSION
In expanding the scope of persons bound by an injunction
beyond the parties to the original action, the courts have done
much to protect plaintiffs. However, to the extent that injunctions
have been applied to persons pursuing their own interests inde-
pendently of party-defendants, the courts have exceeded their
jurisdiction and become legislatures. The extension to include
90. See generally Note, The Range of Federal Injunctions, 6 UTn L. REV.
363 (1959); Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 490 (1964).
91. Cf. United States v. American Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill.
1951).
92. Cf. United Pharmacal Corp. v. United States, 306 F.2d 515 (1st Cir.
1962); United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Mo.
1946).
93. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945); NLRB v.
Blackstone Mfg. Co., 123 F.2d 633, 635 (2d Cir. 1941).
94. See cases cited in note 59 supra.
95. See United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96 (W.D.
Mo. 1946).
96. See notes 53-66 supra and accompanying text.
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agents and aiders and abettors acting for the benefit of a defend-
ant is proper since the only interest involved in these cases is
that of the original defendant, who has had his day in court.
However, where an injunction is extended to successors in interest
solely on the ground of successorship, or to a group of persons
alleged to be a class solely because of a similarity of independent
interests, or to "all persons with knowledge" of the decree, or to
all who come in contact with a certain res, the court has exceeded
the limits of its power.
